Efficient contracts in credit markets subject to interest rate risk : an application of Raviv's insurance model by Arvan, Lanny & Brueckner, Jan K.


FACULTY WORKING
PAPER NO. 1136
Efficient Contracts in Credit Markets
Subject to Interest Rate Risk: An
Application of Raviv's Insurance Model
Lanny An/an
Jan K. Brueckner
RBSTO QFIL.rojAtlOil
College of Commerce and Business Administration
Bureau of Economic and Business Research
University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign

BEBR
FACULTY WORKING PAPER NO. 1136
College of Commerce and Business Administration
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign
April, 1985
Efficient Contracts in Credit Markets Subject to Interest
Rate Risk: An Application of Raviv's Insurance Model
Lanny Arvan, Assistant Professor
Department of Economics
Jan K. Brueckner, Associate Professor
Department of Economics
Digitized by the Internet Archive
in 2011 with funding from
University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign
http://www.archive.org/details/efficientcontrac1136arva
Abstract
This paper derives the structure of the optimal variable-rate loan
contract. The lender is assumed to rely on short-term borrowing in
extending long-term loans, which means that the terms of the contract
must be set before the uncertain future cost of funds is known. As a
result, the contract specifies a "loan-rate" function r(s), which gives
the future loan interest rate r as a function of the future cost of
funds s. The loan-rate function is chosen to maximize the lender's
expected utility given a fixed level of expected utility for the bor-
rower. The resulting optimal control problem is very similar to the
one solved by Raviv ( AER 1979) in analysing the optimal insurance con-
tract. The central result of the analysis is that the slope r(s) of
the loan-rate function satisfies r = a /(a +a ), where a and a are
v u v u v
the absolute risk aversion measures for the borrower and lender respec-
tively. This result shows that it is optimal for the lender (borrower)
to bear more risk (for r to be lower (higher)) the more risk averse is
the borrower (lender) (the higher is a (a ) ) . This result is alsoo u v
generalized in a number of directions.
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1 . Introduction
Interest rate risk, borne by financial institutions has increased
markedly as the credit markets have become more unstable in recent
years. The burden of this new instability has been especially severe
for lending institutions whose balance sheets show the greatest mis-
match between the maturities of assets and liabilities. The savings
and loan industry, for example, which borrows short and lends long,
suffered serious losses in recent years as income from its portfolio
of old mortgages failed to keep pace with the escalating cost of short-
term funds. The specter of such losses has led to the emergence of
adjustable-rate mortgages (ARMs) as well as other types of variable-
rate contracts. These contracts often specify a complex functional
relationship between the future loan interest rate and the lender's
(uncertain) future cost of funds.
In view of the growing popularity of variable-rate loans, it is
important to know what features an efficient contract of this type
would possess. To answer this question, the present paper derives the
form of the optimal variable-rate loan contract, focusing especially on
the contractual relationship between the loan rate and the future cost
of funds. The results of the analysis are especially relevant for
today's mortgage market since they imply that the risk-sharing arrange-
ment involved in the most popular ARMs (those with interest rate caps)
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is inefficient. The analysis applies, however, to any credit market
where lenders rely on short-term borrowing in extending loans of longer
maturi ty
.
The framework, employed in the analysis is very similar to that used
by Raviv (1979) to analyze the optimal insurance contract. In Raviv's
model, the insured party incurs a loss of random size x, for which he
receives an insurance payment according to the "coverage" function
I(x). In the model developed below, the lender (who plays the role of
the insured party) suffers a "loss" s in the uncertain future period
for each long-term dollar loaned. This loss represents the interest
cost of the short-term funds used to extend long-term loans. The len-
der's loss is "covered" by the future interest payment on the loan,
which is related to the uncertain cost of funds by the "loan-rate" func-
tion r(s). Since the interest payment based on r(s) represents a cost
to the borrower, he plays the role of the insurer in the loan model.
As will be seen below, parallel structure of the models means that
Raviv's approach can be used to derive the optimal loan-rate function.
2. Analysis
In Raviv's model, the insurance policy requires a premium payment P
in return for coverage of the random loss x according to the function
I(x). The insured party's net income conditional on x is thus
W + I(x) - x - P, where W is exogenous income. An insurance settlement
of size I is assumed to impose administrative costs of c(I), resulting
in a net income for the insurer equal to w + P - I(x) - c(I(x)) (w is
exogenous income). The optimization problem is to choose P and the
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function !(•) to maximize Che insured party's expected utility while
providing a given level of expected utility to the insurer. A
constraint on the proolem is the requirement <_ I(x) < x, which says
tnat the insurance payment cannot be negative and must be no larger
than the loss.
The loan model has a- single borrower and a single lender who
extends a two-period loan of exogenous size L. For simplicity, it is
assumed tnat the borrower pays only interest on the loan at the end of
each period, with the principal repaid at the end of the second period.
The lender is assumed to rely on short-terra borrowing for his loanable
funds, which means the terras of the loan contract must be set before
the cost of funds in the uncertain second period is known. As a
result, the contract specifies a loan-rate function r(s), which gives
the second period loan interest rate as a function of the short-term
rate that actually prevails in that period. The lender's net income in
the second period is thus (r(s) - s)L, with net income in the first
period equal to (r^ - sQ )L (s„ is the first period's short-terra rate,
which is freely observable, while r^ is the loan rate). Letting y~
and y denote the borrower's incomes in the two periods, net incomes
are y~ - r..L and y - r(s)L in the first and second periods respectively
(y is non-random)." Inflation is assumed to be absent, so that all net
incomes are in real terms.
The parallel structure of the loan and insurance models is clear
from the above discussion. First, recalling the analogy between s and
x and between r and I, comparison of the relevant expressions shows
that the lender's second-period income is similar in form to that of
the insured party (the equi valence is exact if W = P = and L = 1).
Similarly, the borrower's second-period net income is similar in form
to that of the insurer (the equivalence is again exact if P = 0, L = 1,
and c(I) = 0). This suggests that Raviv's results on the optimal
insurance coverage function will apply, at least in part, to the opti-
mal loan-rate function. The following analysis shows that this is
indeed the case.
Letting v denote the lender's utility function (which satisfies
v" < 0), 6 denote his discount rate, and f(s) denote the density func-
tion for s, the lender's discounted expected utility equals
s
v[(r - s )LJ + 6 / v[(r(s) - s)Ljf(s)ds (1)
(s is the maximum value of s) . The loan contract (which specifies r
as well the loan-rate function r(»)) is chosen to maximize (1) subject
to the requirement that the borrower's discounted expected utility
equals some constant. Letting u denote the borrower's concave utility
function and 9 denote his discount rate, this constraint is written
s
u(y
Q
- r
Q
L) + 9 / u(y - r(s)L)f(s)ds = k, (2)
where k is a constant. The maximization problem is solved by choosing
the loan-rate function optimally conditional on r and then optimizing
over r~. Under this procedure, r(») is chosen to maximize the expected
utility integral in (1) subject to the requirement that the expected
utility integral in (2) equals the constant (k - u(y - r L))/9.
Unlike in Raviv's insurance model, there is no upper bound
constraint on r(»). Furthermore, while the constraint r(s)
_> is
-5-
clearly appropriate, there is no reason to expect it to bind in the
present model (the loan contract would offer free interest in this
case). As a result, the nonnegati vity constraint (which was crucial in
yielding a deductible in Raviv's optimal insurance policy) can be
ignored
.
Following Raviv, the Hamiltonian for th« problem of choosing r(
•
) is
{v[(r(s) - s)L] + Xu(y - r(s)L)}f(s), where X is the costate variable.
The optimality conditions are X i dX/ds - and
v'[(r(s) - s)Lj - Xu»(y - r(s)L) = 0, (3)
which show that tne optimal loan-rate function equates the lender's
marginal utility to a constant proportion of the borrower's marginal
utility regardless of the realized value of s. Using (3), it can be
shown that optimal choice of r
n
yields a standard intertemporal effi-
4
ciency condition. The slope of the loan-rate function is found by
• •
differentiating (3) with respect to s, which gives (r - l)v" + Xru" = 0.
Eliminating X using (3) and solving yields
t«—^—. (4)
a + a
u v
where a = -v"/v' and a = -u"/u' are the absolute risk aversion
v u
measures for the lender and borrower respectively (the a's are evalu-
ated at the relevant net income levels). Raviv's eq. (10), which gives
the slope of the insurance coverage function when < I(x) < x, reduces
to (4) when c* = 0.
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Eq. (4) expresses a simple and intuitively appealing rule for the
sharing of interest rate risk, in credit markets. As one would expect,
the equation shows that the slope of the optimal Loan-rate function
is positive and lies between zero and one, indicating that a percentage
point change in the lender's cost of funds yields less than a percentage
point change in the loan rate r. As a result, lender and borrower
share the burden of a higher cost of funds as well as the benefit of a
lower cost. More importantly, however, eq . (4) shows that the manner
in which risk is allocated between lender and borrower depends on the
relation between absolute risk aversion measures. If these measures
are (locally) identical for the lender and borrower, then (4) shows
that r(s) should equal 1/2, indicating an equal (local) division of
interest rate risk. If the lender is (locally) more risk averse than
the borrower (if a is greater than o ), then r(s) should exceed 1/2,
indicating that the borrower (locally) bears more of the interest rate
risk. If the borrower is more risk averse than the lender (if a > a ),
u v
then the reverse conclusion holds, with r(s) < 1/2 and the lender bear-
ing more of the risk. Polar cases emerge when one party is risk neutral.
It is optimal for the borrower to bear all the interest rate risk if he
is risk neutral (r = 1 if a =0), while the lender should bear all the
u
risk if he is risk neutral (r = if a = 0) . It is interesting to note
that although the slope of the loan-rate function in general varies
with s, it is constant when both lender and borrower exhibit constant
absolute risk aversion. In this familiar case, the function is a
straight line with slope between zero and one.
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While trie aoove analysis applies to any credit market where tne
maturities of the lender's assets and liabilities are mismatched, the
analyis is especially useful in evaluating the growing tendency for
risk-sharing in today's mortgage market. Prior to the 198u's, tne
fixed rate mortgage (which satisfies r = 0) was the mainstay of the
savings and loan industry. Although the lender inefficiently absorbs
all risk under such a mortgage, the industry no doubt found such an
arrangement acceptable given the relative stability of the market en-
vironment in which it operated. The heightened volatility of interest
rates in recent years, however, inflicted large losses on the industry
and gave rise to a greater desire for risk sharing. The result was the
introduction of adjustable-rate mortgage (ARM), in which the borrower
absorbs interest rate risk in return for a lower interest cost. This
type of mortgage has become hugely popular in recent years, with ARMs
accounting for over half of new mortgages written in 1984. The most
common ARMs have interest rate caps, which prevent the loan rate from
rising or falling excessively between adjustment periods. At each
adjustment period, the loan rate is set equal to the short-term rate
(or some cost of funds index) plus a markup, with the proviso that the
resulting rate cannot differ from the previous period's loan rate by
more than an amount given by the size of the cap. This relationship is
shown by the jagged curve in Figure 1 (the horizontal segments are sym-
metric around the previous period's loan rate). While the ARM curve
crudely approximates an optimal loan-rate function (shown as a dotted
line in Figure 1), the requirement that interest rate risk be borne
entirely by the lender for high and low values of s and entirely by the
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borrower for intermediate values of s is incompatible with efficiency.
Thus, although the ARM spreads risk, more effectively than a fixed rate
mortgage, the analysis implies that lenders could earn higher profits
by offering ARil contracts satisfying the risk-sharing rule (4). While
this conclusion is noteworthy, the simplicity of the model means that
a negative efficiency verdict based on it should be viewed with some
caution
.
3. Extensions
Having established the usefulness of Raviv's approach in the credit
market context, it is interesting to consider two extensions of the
model. Under the first extension, the lender is allowed to choose his
loan volume (the number of borrowers served). Under the second exten-
sion, the borrower's second period income y becomes random, with the
analysis focusing on how the optimal risk-sharing arrangement changes
when y is correlated with s. To explore the first extension, let n
denote the number of borrowers served by the lender (the loan size L
remains fixed for simplicity). Replacing L in (1) by nL, the first-
order condition for choice of n is
s
(r
"
s )v + 6 / (r(s) " s ) v
' f ( s ) ds = °» < 5 )
where v\ denotes the lender's marginal utility in the first period.
Repeating the previous analysis, the slope of the loan rate function
becomes
no
i = 2_ . . (6)
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Al-though (6) is similar to the earlier slope formula (4), the
appearance of the endogenous variable n on the RHS means that the con-
nection between r and borrower and lender risk, aversion is not as
simple as before. While this complication makes the impact of a change
in a difficult to evaluate, it turns out that the effect of a change in
u
a is easily derived when absolute risk, aversion is constant. In this
v
case, it may be shown that no (and hence r) is invariant to a change
in a , with n falling as a rises and vice versa. Since the intercept
of the (linear) loan rate function and the value of r. are also
invariant to a change in a
,
it follows that the optimal loan contract
is independent of the risk aversion of the lender. The only effect of
an increase in risk aversion in the modified model is a reduction
lender's optimal loan volume. This result is intuitively plausible
given that the variability of the lender's net income (r(s)-s)nL can be
reduced in response to a higher a either by an increase in r holding
n fixed or by a reduction in n holding the loan-rate function fixed.
To investigate the effect of correlation between y and s, let F(s,y)
denote the joint density of these variables, with G(y|s) denoting y's
conditional _density. The borrower's expected utility in the second period
s y
becomes J f u(y - r(s)L)F(s ,y)dsdy , and the Hamiltonian for the con-
° ° 8trol problem (with n = 1) is rewritten as
7
{v[(r(s) - s)L] + A / u(y - r(s)L)G(y | s)dy}f (s) . (7)
With constant absolute risk aversion, the slope of the loan-rate func-
tion is given by
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o - ft
r-r^, («)
where
v
r> y
ft = / u' — dy/L / u'Gdy. (9)3s
If y and s are independent, so that 8G(y|s)/33 = 0, then ft = and (9)
reduces to the previous expression (4). To investigate the dependence
case, suppose that s and y are jointly normally distributed. In this
case, 3G(y|s)/8s is proportional to p(y - £(y | s))G(y | s) , where p is the
9
correlation coefficient bet_ween y and s, and the numerator of ft
y
becomes proportional to p J u'(y - E(y j s))G(y | s)dy. Since u
T is a
decreasing function of y and the remainder of the integrand integrates
to zero, it follows that the integral multiplying p is negative. As a
result, ft , holds as p , 0. This in turn implies that, relative to
the p = case, a negative p lowers r while a positive p raises r (see
(8)). Thus, if the borrower's income is positively (negatively) corre-
lated with s, it is optimal for him to bear more (less) interest rate
risk than when y and s are independent. The reason for these results
is that, for a given loan-rate function, a positive (negative) p de-
creases (increases) the variability of the borrower's net income. To
preserve an optimal balance between net income variabilities in the
case where p rises above zero, the loan rate function must change to
raise the variability of the borrower's interest costs while lowering
the variability of the lender's net income (in other words, r must rise)
The opposite change is called for when p falls below zero.
The above result is of practical interest since over the business
cycle, interest rates and the incomes or certain types of borrowers are
correlated. The incomes of workers in the residential construction
industry, for example, appear to be negatively correlated with interest
rates as a result of the inverse relationship between housing starts
and borrowing costs. The analysis shows that optimal loan contracts
should expose such workers to a relatively low degree of interest rate
risk.
4. Conclusion
This paper has analyzed the optimal variable-rate loan contract
using a framework similar to Raviv's optimal insurance model. In addi-
tion to showing that a variable-rate contract can be viewed as a type
of insurance arrangement, the paper derived results of current practical
interest. In particular, the optimal risk-sharing rule emerging from
the model was shown to provide a useful starting point for evaluating
the efficiency of existing variable-rate contracts. This is an impor-
tant contribution since the variety of such contracts can be expected
to multiply in today's increasingly innovative financial environment.
FIGURE 1. A capped ARM vs. an optimal loan-race
function
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Footnotes
*We wish to thank. Case Sprenkle and James Follain tor coiaments.
Errors are ours, however.
Several earlier papers deal with the maturity mismatch problem.
Deshmukh _et_ al . (1983a) and Niehans and Hewson (1976) analyse the len-
der's choice of the maturity structure of assets and liabilities in
models without variable-rate loan contracts. Deshmukh et al. (1983a)
analyze behavioral differences between lenders who both borrow and lend
short and lenders who accumulate an initial stock of funds for lending
to sequential loan applicants (such lenders in effect borrow long).
2
Although the manner in which the borrower uses the loan is not
relevant to the analysis, one possibility is that the funds are spent
directly on consumption, in which case yn = wn + L and y = w - L, where
w and w denote exogenous incomes. Alternatively, the proceeds of the
loan could be used to purchase a capital good that generates incomes in
the two periods according to the relationships y = h
n
(L) and y = h(L).
Finally, the loan could finance purchase of a consumer durable such as
a house. While utility in this case will depend on the services from
the durable (as measured by L) as well as on net income, the service
argument of the utility function is suppressed under the above formula-
tion (note that in the latter two cases, the loan principal is repaid
with the proceeds from the sale of the asset).
3
The analysis is essentially unchanged when inflation is introduced
provided that price increases are non-random. Stochastic inflation,
however, changes the character of the results.
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The condition is
s s
6 / v'fds 6 / u'fds
"(J
U
where v' and u' represent: marginal utilities in the first period. This
condition states that the expected marginal rates of substitution
between net incomes in the two periods must be the same for lender and
borrower
.
The Federal Borne Loan Bank Board provides monthly market share
data.
Many ARMs also have life-of-loan interest rate caps, which limit
cumulative rate adjustments.
This can be seen by writing equations (2), (5), and the condition
from footnote 4 for the constant absolute risk aversion (exponential
utility) case using a linear r with slope (6). In the equations, n
and a only appear in the product expression no , establishing that if
n solves the optimization problem with a = a , then n = no /a solves
v v v v
the problem when o = o .r
v v
o
If y were freely observable to the lender, then the optimal
contract would make the loan rate contingent on both y and s, with a
loan-rate function of the form r(s,y). For the above formulation to
represent a first-best optimum, y must be unobservable to the lender.
9Joint normality implies that G(yjs) is proportional to
exp{ — [y - u - pe (s - u Q )/eJ }
2£
v
(i-p z ) y y
ss
2
wnere u and u are the means of v and s ana e and z are the variancesK y s v s
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